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Kaminsky: Defamation Law: Once a Public Figure Always a Public Figure?

DEFAMATION LAW: ONCE A PUBLIC
FIGURE ALWAYS A PUBLIC FIGURE?
A living person is not a means to an end. Events may be symbolic,

but individuals are not mere symbols.'

How should the passage of time affect public-figure status in
defamation suits? In many cases the answer is clear. Plaintiffs such
as world leaders' and renowned entertainers 3 achieve such a level of
celebrity that they must always be viewed as public figures. But for
others, including a former child prodigy, 4 an ex-girlfriend of Elvis
Presley,5 and a former prosecutrix in a rape trial,6 the answer is not
so obvious. Clearly a state's interest in protecting the good name and
reputation of its citizens in defamation actions is most significant
when the citizen is a private individual.7 Conversely, the need to ex1. Street v. N.B.C., 646 F.2d 1227, 1250 (6th Cir. 1981) (Peck, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted).
2. Jimmy Carter, as a former President, would undoubtedly have been considered a public figure had he decided to pursue a cause of action for libel against the Washington Post.
Carter decided not to bring suit upon the Post's retraction of its statement, which suggested
that Carter had employed electronic listening devices in Blair House to eavesdrop on the ReaU.S. NEws &
gans during his last weeks in office. Celebrity Journalism:It Sells But ....
WORLD REP., Jan. 18, 1982, at 55.
3. See, e.g., Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 209-10 (7th Cir. 1976) (entertaminer Johnny Carson held to be "all-purpose" public figure); Cepeda v. Cowles Magazines &
Broadcasting, Inc., 392 F.2d 417, 419 (9th Cir. 1968) (professional baseball player held to be
public figure).
4. See Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711
(1940). Sidis, at the age of eleven, was considered a distinguished mathematician, and graduated from Harvard University at the age of sixteen amid widespread public attention. Subsequently, however, he avoided all publicity. Id. at 807. Sidis, however, was not a defamation
suit. See infra text accompanying notes 88-89.
5. See Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
101 S. Ct. 3112 (1981). Anita Brewer (ne6 Woods) gained media exposure through her relationship with pop singer Elvis Presley. In the roughly ten years since the end of their romance,
Brewer had remained out of the limelight. Id. at 1248.
6. See Street v. N.B.C., 645 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1981), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 50 U.S.L.W. 3477 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1981)(No. 80-6835). Mrs. Street was the prosecutrix
in a highly publicized rape trial, which came to be known as the Scottsboro Boys Trial. In the
forty years since the controversial trial, Mrs. Street sought to avoid all media attention. Id. at
1235.
7. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341-44 (1974). The Court recognized
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tend first amendment protection to allegedly defamatory statements
by press and media defendants is strongest when the plaintiff is a
public figure.8
The actual malice test, first developed in the landmark case of
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,9 was designed to strike a balance
between these two competing interests10 by requiring a plaintiff who
was a public official to establish that a media defendant published
defamatory material in reckless or knowing disregard of the truth.
This test has evolved to the point where all public figures are required to establish a reckless or knowing disregard of the truth by a
media defendant to prevail in a defamation action.11
Classification as a public figure is often the difference between
victory and defeat for a defamed plaintiff 2 because of the differences in burdens of proof required of the public figure and the private figure. In contrast to its holding that the highly defendant-protective actual malice requirement must be met by public figures,
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.13 held that private individuals need es14
tablish only the degree of fault mandated by state common law,
which is often the mere showing of a defendant's negligence.1 5 Acthat since private individuals are more vulnerable to injury, the state interest in protecting
their right to reputation is correspondingly higher than its interest in protecting the name and
reputation of a public figure. Id.
8. Id. The Gertz Court realized that private individuals do not have the same media
access to rebut defamatory statements as do public figures.
9. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
10. For a discussion of the balance struck by the Supreme Court between freedom of the
press and an individual's right to reputation, see Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship,
53 TEx. L. REv. 422 (1975); Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, 54 Tax. L. REv.
199 (1976).
11, Compare Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (private figure required to prove actual malice because issue involved matter of public concern) with Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)(private figure need not show New York Times malice). For a discussion of Rosenbloom and Gertz, see infra notes 38-52.
12. "Plainly many deserving plaintiffs. . . will be unable to surmount the barrier of the
New York Times test." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974). But see Burnett v. National Enquirer, Inc., No. C-157213 (Cal. Super. Mar. 26, 1981) (public figure able
to show actual malice); Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1979) (public figure able to prove actual malice of defendant). Once actual malice is
shown, the amount of the award for a public figure is usually substantial. In the Burnett case,
for example, Carol Burnett was awarded $1.6 million, which was eventually reduced to
$800,000. Celebrity Journalism: It Sells But...
supra note 2, at 55.
13. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
14. Id. at 346. For a discussion of state law interpretive standards since Gertz, see
Frakt, The Evolving Law of Defamation: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. and Beyond, 6 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 471 (1975).
15. 418 U.S. at 346-47.
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cordingly, the determination that a plaintiff is a public figure is frequently a crucial blow, if not the death knell, to a defamation action.
Although the criteria for determining who should be a public
figure are the subject of much debate,1 6 the rationale for the classification is generally accepted: Public figures must expect to be subjected to more criticism than private citizens. The media, due to society's need for instantaneous coverage of important people or
events, requires more protection when commenting upon a person
who is in the public eye. 17 Understandably, this type of reporting
leaves little time for verification of sources or doublechecking of
facts; because of the possibility of an occasional false report, the
press needs protection.' 8 Yet, in unusual cases, individuals who
achieve public-figure status because of their involvement in a specific
event or controversy retreat from the public eye and are largely forgotten. Later historical analysis can portray these figures in a defamatory light. The issue of the media's continuing need for the protection of the actual malice standard then becomes a far closer
question.
Not surprisingly, given the changing contours of public-figure
defamation law, this question has not yet been fully explored.19 This
note analyzes the controversial and still unanswered issue of whether
the passage of time can ever completely extinguish a person's prior
public-figure classification. The first section briefly summarizes developments in defamation law and the public-figure doctrine since
the New York Times case. Section two analyzes the courts of appeals decisions that have addressed the issue of how the passage of
time affects a person's public-figure status, with particular focus on
16. "Defining public figures is much like trying to nail a jellyfish to the wall." Rosanova
v. Playboy Ents., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 1976). For a discussion of the inconsistencies in the application of defamation law, see Bamberger, Public Figures and the Law of
Defamation:A Concept in Search of Definition 33 Bus. LAW. 709 (1978); Christie, Injury to
Reputation and the Constitution: Confusion Amid Conflicting Approaches, 75 MICH. L. REV.
43 (1976).
17. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342-43. Conversely, this note advocates that historical analysis does not need as much protection as contemporaneous reporting. See infra notes 127-32
and accompanying text.
18. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270-72; accord Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443
U.S. 157, 171 (1979)(Blackmun, J., concurring). A contrary result would impede robust debate on public questions, which is one of the core values of the first amendment. New York
Times, 376 U.S. at 271-72.
19. For a discussion of the differences in the interpretation of public-figure defamation
law between the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals, see infra text accompanying notes
164-67.
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the recent Sixth Circuit decision of Street v. N.B.C. 0 The third section focuses on how the Supreme Court should eventually decide the
issue, based on an analysis of its earlier defamation decisions. It also
considers the ramifications of the settlement in Street on this still
undecided issue. Section four proposes a standard that can be applied to future cases involving defamed public figures who have long
since shed their public-figure status.
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC FIGURE DOCTRINE

An individual's right to his or her good reputation and privacy
and the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press are two
of our most basic liberties. Indeed, the Supreme Court has found
balancing these interests to be a very delicate and somewhat elusive
task.2 '
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,22 the Supreme Court delineated guidelines for reconciling these twin conflicting interests when
it held that public officials could prevail in a defamation suit only by
showing that a publication was made with actual malice or in reckless disregard of the truth. 23 There, the plaintiff was the Police Commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama. He was alleged to have been
defamed by an advertisement in the New York Times that inaccurately, and less than favorably, described the police department, and
by implication, the police commissioner's handling of the civil rights
protests and the arrest of Dr. Martin Luther King during the early
1960's. 2" The Supreme Court's reversal of the judgment for the
2 5 was based on the trial court's failure to require the plainplaintiff
20. 645 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1981). Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
the case, 50 U.S.L.W. 3245 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1981)(No. 80-6835), a settlement by the parties
forced the Court to dismiss the appeal. Id. at 3477 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1981)(No. 80-6835)(appeal
dismissed per stipulation).
21, Justice Powell acknowledged that there is a tension between the need for an uninhibited press and the interest in addressing wrongful injury. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 342 (1974). The Supreme Court, since the introduction of the actual malice requirement in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), has frequently faced the
difficult issue of its proper application. For an analysis of the relevant Supreme Court decisions, see infra text accompanying notes 30-78.
22. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
23. Id. at 279-80. The actual malice requirement was subsequently clarified: It requires
a plaintiff to show that a false publication was made with a "high degree of awareness of [the
statement's] probable falsity." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
24. 376 U.S. at 257-58.
25. Id. at 261, rev'g 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962). At trial, the judge instructed
the jury that if the statement was published by the defendant and referred to the plaintiff, it
should award actual and compensatory damages, which it did. See 376 U.S. at 262.
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tiff to show that the newspaper published the advertisement in reckless disregard of the truth. 6 Thus, the actual malice test was born;
for the first time, the Court recognized the constitutional dimension
of the need to afford greater protection to the press in circumstances
where the plaintiff is a public official.27 Acknowledging that occasional erroneous statements are inevitable, the Court concluded that
protection for media defendants is necessary if freedom of expression
is to survive.2" At common law, truth had been the only defense to
an allegedly defamatory statement. 9
Although the New York Times decision has been heralded as
"the greatest victory [for] defendants in the modern history of the
law of tort,"30 a workable balance between freedom of the press and
the individual's right to privacy still had not been reached, as it became apparent that the public-official category was too narrow a
classification to afford the press the protection it needed."' Appropriately, the class of persons of whom a higher standard of proof was
required was expanded in the case of Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts. 2 The plaintiffs, a well-known college football coach and a retired major general, were respectively accused of fixing a football
game and participating in a campus riot.33 The Court held that the
New York Times standard was equally applicable to all public
figures," of which class the plaintiffs were members. The Court reasoned that speech should not be limited to commentary on politics
and government,3 5 and broadened the class of public figures to encourage free discussion of issues of "science, morality, and [the]
arts,"36 as well as other areas of public interest.
The class of persons required to prove New York Times malice
was further extended by a plurality of the Court in Rosenbloom v.
26.

376 U.S. at 285-88.

27. Id. at 264. The Supreme Court found that the law of Alabama was "constitutionally
deficient" in not affording the press adequate protection in libel suits brought by public offi-

cials. Id. at 271-72.
28. Id. at 271-72.
29. 3 J. DOOLEY,

MODERN TORT LAW

ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§

30.
31.
32.
Walker
33.
34.
"highly
35.
36.

§ 35.02, at 2 (1977); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
116, at 796 (4th ed. 1971).
W. PROSSER, supra note 29, § 118, at 819.
See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
388 U.S. 130 (1967). Butts was a consolidated opinion in which Associated Press v.
was also decided.
Id. at 135.
Id. at 155. The majority held that the standard to be applied in these instances was
unreasonable conduct." Id.
Id. at 147 (citing Time, Inc., v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 378 (1967)).
Id.
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Metromedia, Inc.37 There, the plaintiff was a magazine distributor
who had been referred to by the defendant as a "girlie-book peddler."3 Although Rosenbloom was not a public figure,3 the plurality
reasoned that he should be required to prove actual malice nonetheless.40 Whereas Butts extended the New York Times doctrine by removing the distinction between public officials and public figures,41
the Rosenbloom plurality determined that there was no conceptual
basis for differentiating between matters of public concern where a
plaintiff is a public figure and matters of public concern where the
plaintiff is not a public figure.' 2 Justice Brennan spoke for the plurality: "[C]onstitutional protection [will be extended] to all ... communication[s] involving matters of public or general concern, without regard to whether the persons involved are famous or
anonymous."' 3
Shortly thereafter, however, a majority of the Court stated that
the Rosenbloom plurality's proposed balance had been struck too
much in favor of press protection. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,44
the Court retreated. In light of the inequities caused by requiring a
private citizen to prove actual malice, the Court redrew the line:45
private individuals, regardless of surrounding circumstances, would
no longer be required to show New York Times malice. 46 The Court
37. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). The plurality consisted of Justice Brennan, who wrote the opinion, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun. Id. at 30. Justices Black and White concurred. Id. at 57 (Black, J., concurring); id. (White, J., concurring). The dissent was by Justices Harlan, id. at 62 (Harlan, J., dissenting), Stewart, and Marshall. Id. at 78 (Marshall J.,
dissenting).
38. Id. at 34-35.
39. Id. at 43-44 (plurality); id. at 59-62 (White, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 44.
41. 388 U.S. at 162-65.
42. 403 U.S. at 42-48; id. at 59-62 (White, J., concurring). The Court went so far as to
approve implicitly of the court of appeals' statement that "the fact that the plaintiff was not a
public figure cannot be accorded decisive importance." 415 F.2d 892, 896 (3rd Cir. 1969); see
403 U.S. at 45-46.
43. 403 U.S. at 44 (footnote omitted).
44. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). In civil litigation, Gertz represented the family of a convicted
murderer who was shot and killed by a Chicago policeman. In an article dealing with the
officer's criminal trial, defendant's publication falsely accused Gertz of belonging to a Communist organization which had allegedly devised an attack on the Chicago Police force. Id. at
325-26.
45. 14. at 339-48. The Court stated that a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure may not claim the
New York Times actual malice protection. Id. at 352.
46. Id. at 345-46.
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reasoned that public figures have greater access to the media, 47
which adequately enables them to refute false statements, and that

public figures, unlike most private individuals, have voluntarily subjected themselves to public scrutiny.4 The Court went on to acknowledge that private persons are more vulnerable to injury because they lack media access to refute defamatory remarks, and that
the state interest in protecting them is thus correspondingly higher.4 9
It was then left to each state to establish its own standard (as long as

it was not strict liability) to govern liability in cases where private
individuals were defamed.50
The Gertz criteria of access to the media and voluntarily seek-

ing the spotlight have generally been accepted and followed. 5' Yet
now that the key element is once again public-figure status, Gertz

has been criticized for failing to delineate reasoned criteria to determine who should be considered public figures.52 Subsequent decisions

have acknowledged that the public-figure concept is difficult to
quantify.53
Gertz made a preliminary distinction between all-purpose public
figures-those individuals who have achieved such fame that they
should rightfully be considered public figures for all purposes-and
limited public figures-those individuals who have subjected themselves to public scrutiny for only a limited range of issues. 54 This
limited-public-figure category has, in turn, also given rise to
confusion.55
47. Id. at 343-45.
48. Id. at 345: "[T]hose classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront
of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved."
49. Id. at 344.
50. Id. at 347-50.
51. See, e.g., Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979). It has also been expanded upon. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448 (1976)(plaintiff held not to be public figure where he did not seek to influence
public opinion). For a discussion of the Firestone case, see infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
52. E.g., Bamberger, supra note 16, at 709, 715-19.
53. The Supreme Court's reversal of both Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S.
157 (1979), rev'g 578 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1978), and Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111
(1979), rev'g 579 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1978), show that the Gertz criteria by themselves are a
difficult guide to determining public-figure status. See infra text accompanying notes 58-78.
54. 418 U.S. at 351.
55. See infra notes 58-78 and accompanying text. The Gertz Court indicated that classification as a limited-purpose public figure would reflect the more common situation whereby
an individual becomes involved in a particular controversy with a limited range of issues. 418
U.S. at 351.
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The three most significant Supreme Court decisions" refining
the definition of a public figure have all been controversial.57 The
first of these was Time, Inc. v. Firestone,8 where the plaintiff, the
ex-wife of a prestigious businessman, alleged that Time magazine
had defamed her by printing a short note intimating that her divorce
was a result of adulterous activity.59 Applying the Gertz criteria-seeking attention voluntarily and having media access-it is
conceivable that Mrs. Firestone could have been considered a public
figure.60 The Supreme Court, however, over vigorous dissent,61 held
that Mrs. Firestone did not merit public-figure status, based in part
on the newly advanced justification that she was not in a position to
influence government or public opinion.62 With the addition of this
new criterion-being in a position to influence public opinion-the
Time decision continued the trend initiated in Gertz of narrowing
the class of people who could qualify as public figures. 63 This trend
continued in the second of the three cases, Hutchinson v.
Proxmire.4
In Hutchinson, the plaintiff was a scientist receiving government funds for research into certain areas of animal behavior. The
defendant United States Senator "honored" him by bestowing upon
Hutchinson's sponsors a "Golden Fleece of the Month Award" for
wasteful government spending. 5 The district court and the court of
56. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire,
443 U.S. 111 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
57. Under a literal interpretation of the Gertz rationale, these three cases could have
been decided differently by the Supreme Court. For a discussion of the view that these decisions reflect the Supreme Court's desire to narrow the public-figure classification, see infra text
accompanying notes 63, 67, 73.
58. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
59. Id. at 452.
60. Mrs. Firestone sued her husband for separate maintenance. He, in turn, counterclaimed for divorce on grounds of cruelty and adultery. Id. at 450. Mrs. Firestone conducted
press conferences during the proceedings, which attracted wide coverage. Id. at 485 (Marshall,
J., dissenting). The Time article quoted the trial judge who stated that there had been enough
extramarital activity to "make Dr. Freud's hair curl." Id. at 452. There can be little doubt
that Mrs. Firestone had access to the media and voluntarily thrust herself into the public eye;
accordingly, she would have been considered a public figure under Gertz.
61. Id. at 471 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 484 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 453. "Respondent did not assume any role of especial prominence in the affairs of society. . . and she did not [try to] influence the resolution of the issues involved." Id.
63. Gertz narrowed the class of those who must show actual malice from all those involved in matters of public concern to those individuals who could be considered public figures
for defamation purposes. 418 U.S. at 345-46; see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
64. 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
65, Id. at 114-15. Hutchinson had received an estimated total of $500,000 to study why
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appeals 6 both found the plaintiff to be a public figure based upon
his receipt of a government grant. The Supreme Court, in contrast,
concluded that he was not a public figure because his activity, although of some public concern, was not enough of an issue to warrant public-figure status. 67 The Court also noted that a private plaintiff cannot become a public figure merely because of publicity
generated by a defendant's publication.68 Again, the class of public
figures was narrowed as the Gertz criteria were further qualified.
Soon after Hutchinson, the Court decided Wolston v. Reader's
Digest Ass'n.69 Wolston had been falsely accused of being a Russian
spy in defendant's article.7 0 The defense argued that Wolston had
voluntarily thrust himself into the public eye by failing to appear as
a witness in a spy trial, which had occurred more than ten years
earlier. 71 As in Hutchinson, the lower courts found that the plaintiff
was a public figure,72 and so required him to show actual malice.
The Supreme Court, however, once again narrowed the public-figure
classification, holding that Wolston's prior involvment in a criminal
proceeding was not enough to make him a public figure.7 3 Justice
Blackmun, joined by Justice Marshall in a concurring opinion, suggested that the lapse of time between the trial and the defendant's
publicatiori had erased Wolston's prior public-figure status.7 4
These decisions demonstrate the Supreme Court's continuing
search for an appropriate constitutional balance. After an initial extension of the public-figure doctrine in the early cases of Butts and
monkeys behave aggressively under various circumstances. Id. at 115.
66. 579 F.2d 1027, 1034-35 (7th Cir. 1978), af'g 431 F. Supp. 1311, 1327 (W.D. Wis.
1977). In addition to Hutchinson's receipt of government grants, both courts relied heavily on

Hutchinson's voluntary solicitation of funds and the local press coverage he received. They also
considered his receipt of funds a matter of public interest. 579 F.2d at 1034-35; 431 F. Supp.

at 1327.
67.

443 U.S. at 133-36.

68.

Id. at 135 (citing Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 167-68 (1979)).

69.
70.

443 U.S. 157 (1979).
Id. at 159.

71.

Id. at 162. Wolston had failed to respond to a grand jury subpeona and was held in

contempt of court. Although the contempt proceeding generated much public attention, the

publicity subsided following Wolston's sentencing. Id. at 162-68.
72.

429 F. Supp. 167, 176 (D.D.C. 1977), affd, 578 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1978). "In

choosing not to comply, Wolston knew, or reasonably should have known, that he would attract attention again, precisely the sort of attention that he challenged in this case." Id. at 177.
73. 443 U.S. at 166.

74. Id. at 170 (Blackmun, J., concurring)(footnote omitted): "Because I believe that the
lapse of the intervening 16 years renders consideration of this petitioner's original public figure

status unnecessary, I concur only in the [determination that the plaintiff is not currently a
public figure]."
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Rosenbloom,7 5 it reversed the trend. 76 In sharp contrast to the courts
of appeals, 77 the Supreme Court has consistently narrowed the public-figure category by adding new criteria, which effectively limit the
reach of Gertz.78 These decisions also raise the question of whether
the passage of time should extinguish a person's public-figure status.
TREATMENT OF THE

ISSUE BY THE COURTS OF APPEALS

The issue of whether a person can ever shed public-figure status,
although of great significance, is a narrow question. The dearth of
case law focusing on the issue is a result of the several preliminary
factual determinations that must be made before the issue is even
considered. These include both a finding that a plaintiff was at some
time a public figure and that the publication in question is indeed
defamatory. In addition, in many instances where it might be appropriate for a plaintiff to argue that he or she is no longer a public
figure, a plaintiff will not raise the issue because of the unfavorable
state of the law, claiming instead that he or she was never a public
figure. In short, this can be regarded as a last ditch argument by a
plaintiff when all prior fact finding has been adverse.7 9 While these
factors help to explain the lack of a definitive answer as to the affect
of the passage of time on a person's public-figure status, the question
remains potentially important. Should the issue eventually be decided so as to allow a return to private-citizen status, a new strategy
would become available to plaintiffs, allowing circumvention of the
actual malice requirement in appropriate defamation actions.80
At present, however, the defamed plaintiff must contend with
uniformly unfavorable law in the federal appellate courts. The courts
75. See supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 56-74 and accompanying text.
77. The appellate courts, in contrast to the Supreme Court, had found that Hutchinson
and Wolston were public figures, based on the Gertz criteria.
78. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.

79. This particular argument was appropriate but was not raised by the plaintiff on
appeal in Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979). See id. at 166 n.7. The
strategy of Wolston's counsel, it appears, was to argue that Wolston never had attained public-

figure status at any time during his life, rather than to rely on the argument that the passage
of time had removed that status. See id. But see id. at 170-71 (Blackmun, J., concurring)(16
year lapse between possible public status and publication returns plaintiff to private-figure

status).
80. Since only current public figures must establish actual malice, former public figures
would have to establish only the degree of fault mandated by state law, an analytical distinction which flows from Gertz. 418 U.S. at 347-50 (private individuals need only establish degree of fault required by state law to prevail in defamation action).
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of appeals' view in determining public-figure status is in accord with
their treatment of the issue of whether a public figure can eventually
return to private-individual status: The class is kept as broad as possible in both situations.81 The Second, 2 Fourth,83 Fifth,84 Sixth,8"
and District of Columbia"6 Circuits have all addressed the issue,
and, not surprisingly, have kept the class of public figures broad. The
circuits have been virtually unanimous in their declaration that public-figure status, once achieved, remains with an individual, at least
to some extent, for the rest of his or her life. 87 Although the results
in the various courts of appeals cases have been the same, the rationale has differed significantly. It thus becomes important to analyze
both the facts of each case and the rationale underlying each particular court's decision.
Sidis v. F-R Publishing Co.
In a case that predates both New York Times and Gertz, the
question of retaining public-figure status over time was addressed by
the Second Circuit in Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp."" William Sidis
had been a child prodigy, the focus of intense media attention for
almost six years. For the next twenty years, however, he returned to
a life of privacy and was largely unheard of until the defendant magazine published a column entitled "Where Are They Now," disclosing information about Sidis that he would have preferred kept from
public knowledge.8 9 The court held that the issue of Sidis' intellectual promise was still a matter of public concern, reasoning that "at
some point the public interest in obtaining information becomes
dominant over the individual's desire for privacy. ' 9° The court ac81. Indeed, at least one circuit court has declared that once a person qualifies as a public
figure, he remains one for life. Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3112 (1981).
82. Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013
(1978).
83. Time, Inc. v. Johnston, 448 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1971).
84. Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101
S. Ct. 3112 (1981).
85. Street v. N.B.C., 645 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1981), appeal dismissed per stipulation,
50 U.S.L.W. 3477 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1981)(No. 80-6855).
86. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 578 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd. 443 U.S.
157 (1979).
87. See infra notes 101, 112, 120, 150 and accompanying text.
88. 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940).
89. Id. at 807. The entire article traced Sidis' early prominence as a mathematician and
then recounted his breakdown and the resentment Sidis harbored for his earlier fame. Id.
90. Id. at 809.
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knowledged that Sidis' fame was reason to allow the press to reveal
more information about Sidis' private life than would have been permissible had he been a private figure. Nonetheless, the court went on
to note that if the revelations had been "so unwarranted as to outrage community notions of decency," Sidis would have prevailed in
his privacy suit, notwithstanding his public-figure status. 91
It must be noted that Sidis' primary cause of action was for
invasion of his right to privacy, 2 specifically, public disclosure by the
defendant of private facts concerning him."3 Although public-figure
status affects a plaintiff's chance of success in both the privacy and
defamation contexts, it has an even more devasting impact on privacy plaintiffs. In a privacy case, the press will be protected not only
for publication without malice of false information, but also for pub'
lication of true statements, however intimate, so long as the revelations are not unwarranted. 4
Of great importance in the Sidis case was the plaintiff's concession that all the material published by the defendant was true. 95 The
case therefore raises several important questions. It is debatable
whether the result would have been the same had the remarks made
by the defendant been highly defamatory. It is also arguable that the
Sidis result would have been different had the case been decided
after New York Times and Gertz. Although the courts relied on Sidis' prior public-figure status in reaching its decision,e if the revelations made by the defendant had been false and the actual malice
standard used, Sidis might have been decided in the plaintiff's
97
favor.
91.

Id.

92. Id. The major issue in the case was not defamation, since the revelations made by
the defendant were truthful. Id. at 807. A privacy cause of action can arise in one of several
ways. It can be based on unwarranted appropriation of the plaintiff's likeness, see, e.g., N.Y.
Civ. RiGHTs LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1976), or it can be based on the public disclosure of
private facts, which formed the bases of Sidis' suit, and which is a more controversial cause of
action. W. PROSSER, supra note 29, § 117, at 809-12.
93. 113 F.2d at 807.
94. W. PROSSER, supra note 29, § 117, at 812. Prosser suggests that Sidis stands for the
proposition that there will be liability only for truthful revelations where community mores
would regard the revelations as highly objectionable. Id.
95. The court reasoned that truthful comments on a person's public characteristics such
as "dress, speech, habits, and the ordinary aspects of personality" do not cross the line into
unwarranted intrusions. 113 F.2d at 809.
96. Id.
97. As the actual malice test had not yet been developed at this time, such a result is, of

course, speculative.
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Meeropol v. Nizer
The Second Circuit again confronted the issue over thirty years
later in Meeropol v. Nizer.98 The plaintiffs were the children of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, controversial figures who were convicted
and executed for conspiring to transmit to the Soviet Union information deemed vital to national security.99 The Rosenberg trial, and
incidentally the Rosenberg children, were the subject of national attention. After the trial, the plaintiffs lived a private life with adoptive parents for twenty years. Very few people knew their identity
until the defendant published an allegedly defamatory book based on
the trial.100 In plaintiffs' suit for invasion of privacy and defamation,
the court held that they were public figures 01 and therefore required
them to show defendants' reckless disregard of the truth.
While Meeropol is often cited as authority for the proposition
that public figures retain their status over time,102 upon closer analysis, it appears that the court never addressed the issue. The court
reasoned that "if we assumed arguendo that [the plaintiffs] were not
'public figures' at the time this book was published, the book could
not have defamed them ...since the book never referred to them by
the Meeropol name or in any way linked the Rosenbergs to the
Meeropols." 103 This passage of the court's opinion acknowledges the
problem of identification inherent in the case. 04 Whatever the public-figure status of the Rosenberg children, the plaintiffs were known
as Meeropol (their adoptive parents' name) rather than Rosenberg
(their natural parents' name).10 5 Thus, it is arguable that the Meero98. 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978). The defamation
aspect of the case was secondary. The primary issue concerned copyright infringement. Id. at

1063.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1067-68.
101.

Id. at 1066. The court reasoned that "'an individual may achieve such pervasive

fame and notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts' and
'such persons assume special prominence in the resolution of public questions.'" Id. (quoting
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351).
102. See, e.g., Street v. N.B.C., 645 F.2d 1227, 1235 (6th Cir. 1981), appealdismissed
per stipulation, 50 U.S.L.W. 3477 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1981) (No. 80-6835); Wolston v. Reader's

Digest Ass'n, 578 F.2d 427, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd, 443 U.S. 157 (1979). Street comments, however, that the Meeropol court accepts only sub silentio the notion that public

figures must remain such over the passage of time. 645 F.2d at 1235.
103. 560 F.2d at 1068. The plaintiffs' identity was not known until they exposed it
themselves. Id.

104. A plaintiff is not defamed unless the defamatory publication can be understood to
refer specifically to the plaintiff. W. PROSSER, supra note 29, § 111, at 749.

105.

560 F.2d at 1067-68.
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pol children, who were relatively anonymous individuals, were not
public figures at the time of the suit. Inasmuch as the allegedly defamatory material never revealed their identity to the public, the
plaintiffs as Meeropols had not suffered the individualized personal
injury which the defamation cause of action requires. 10 6 As the Rosenberg children, the plaintiffs had satisfied the identification element, but were held to the higher standard of actual malice. 10 7 The
result, therefore, ultimately turned on the issue of the plaintiffs'
identity in that there was no injury, rather than on their publicfigure status, which required them to make the more difficult showing of the defendant's actual malice in publishing the book.108 The
court's opinion never, even by implication, addressed the issue of losing public-figure status over time. Yet curiously, Meeropol is often
cited for that proposition. 0
Time, Inc. v. Johnston
In Time, Inc. v. Johnston, 0 the plaintiff, a retired basketball
player currently employed as an assistant basketball coach, sued a
sports magazine for publishing an interview critical of the plaintiff's
playing abilities."' The Fourth Circuit found that the plaintiff was
still a public figure regardless of his retirement from professional
basketball." 2 Thus, his failure to establish actual malice resulted in
the defendant's victory."13 Yet this case is demonstrably different
from the more troublesome situation of an acknowledged public
figure who has made a deliberate effort to return to private life and
relinquish his or her public-figure status. The Johnston court recognized that the plaintiff was still involved in basketball, and that he
had relied heavily on his reputation as a professional athlete to fur106.

Id. at 1068. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs failed to show even a single

instance where the defendant had published defamatory statements about them in reckless
disregard of the truth. Id. at 1066.

107. As sons of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, the Rosenberg children were required to
show actual malice. As the Meeropol children, they were required merely to establish negli-

gence. The critical aspect of the case, however, is that the defendant's book never defamed the
plaintiffs as the Meeropols. Id. at 1068.
108. Id. at 1066.
109.
110.

E.g., cases cited supra note 102.
448 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1971).

Ill. Id. at 379. The interview claimed that Johnston was so intimidated by another
player that his own abilities were greatly diminished.

112. Id. at 383.
113.

Id. at 385.
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ther his new career as a coach.11 The court decided that he had
never left the profession that initially propelled him to public-figure
status: Until the time of defendant's publication, he was drawing attention to himself in sports." 15
Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co.

Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 1 6 one of the more recent
cases to address the issue, is the best reasoned authority for denying
a public figure the right to return to private-citizen status. The plain-

tiff's romance with Elvis Presley had been the focus of much media
attention.1 1 7 Ten years after the plaintiff had last been in the lime-

light, the defendant published a short article falsely accusing the8
plaintiff of meeting secretly with Presley .to "re-unite" with him.1
As the publication was libelous per se," 9 the case turned on whether
the plaintiff should be considered a public figure. The court found
Brewer to be a public figure at the height of her relationship with
Presley and concluded that she could not completely shed her publicfigure status in connection with the very issue that had initially

brought her into the public eye.12 0 The court also noted that it was
reported that Brewer had used her relationship with the popular
singer to further her own career as an entertainer. 21
114. Id. at 381. Interestingly, the district court concluded that the plaintiff had indeed
shed public-figure status since his retirement as a player. 321 F. Supp. 837, 851 (M.D.N.C.
1970).
115. Johnston cannot be fairly compared with other factual situations where a plaintiff
completely severs himself or herself from the events that made him or her a public figure. It
would be appropriate to conclude that Johnston never ceased being a public figure. The Johnston court noted, however, that it might favor a holding that public figures should not be
allowed to return to private-citizen status. 448 F.2d at 381-82. In so doing, the court relied
heavily on Sidis. Id. at 382.
116. 626 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3112 (1981).
117. Id. at 1248.
118. Id. at 1240.
119. Id. at 1245. Since both she and Presley were married, the defendant's publication
was determined to be libel per se because it implicitly accused them of participation in an
adulterous affair. The article also incorrectly reported that the plaintiff had recently been divorced. Id. at 1244-45. The plaintiff's husband also filed suit for defamation.
For a thorough discussion of public figure law as applied to relatives of public figures, see
Note, An Analysis of the Distinction Between Public Figures and Private Defamation Plaintiffs Applied to Relatives of Public Persons, 49 So. CAL. L. REv. 1131 (1976).
120. 626 F.2d at 1257. The court noted: "[D]uring the 'active' public figure period a
wider range of articles ... are protected by the malice standard and ...

the passage of time

or intentional retreat narrows the range of articles so protected to those directly related to the
basis for fame." Id.
121. Id. at 1248. Brewer's career consisted of promotional appearances after she had
won several beauty contests. Many press reports at the time attributed her individual success
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Several important factors differentiate Brewer from other cases
focusing on the issue. Unlike the professional athlete in Johnston,
the plaintiff here had totally disassociated herself from the events
that led to her public-figure status; 22 unlike Sidis, the main cause of
action here was defamation;1 23 and unlike the plaintiffs in Meeropol,
the allegedly defamatory statements here clearly expose the plaintiff's identity. 24 In addition, nine years had elapsed between the
height of the plaintiffs celebrity status and the defamation.1 25 Also
noteworthy is that this case was decided after Sidis, Johnson, and
Meeropol; perhaps the Brewer court was constrained
by unanimous,
26
although not completely reasoned authority.
Yet, persuasive as this decision may be for requiring permanent
public-figure status, it remains questionable. Ironically, a careful
reading of this opinion reveals that this decision, of all the relevant
court of appeals decisions, came the closest to permitting declassification of a once public figure. The Brewer majority was very receptive to the arguments of Justices Blackmun and Marshall in their
concurrence in Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 127 that historical
analysis of an event is not worthy of the same actual malice protection given to contemporary reporting. The Brewer court went so far
as to note that Justice Blackmun's approach would be inapplicable
here because it applies only to public figures whose fame is tied to
specific events or occurrences, 12 8 whereas Brewer's public-figure status was not the result of a particular controversy. 29 Whether the
to her relationship with Presley. Id.
122, Mrs. Brewer asserted that since her romance with Presley ended, she had disassociated herself from the famous singer, and had retired from entertainment. Id.
123. Although there are aspects of invasion of privacy in the case, Brewer contended
that the contents of the defendant's article were undoubtedly defamatory. In addition, since
the article was libel per se, Brewer was not required to prove actual damages. Id. at 1246.
124. Id. at 1240. The article clearly indicated that Anita Wood, now Anita Brewer, was
re-uniting with Presley.
125. Id. at 1248.
126. Id. at 1256-57.
127. 443 U.S. 157, 169 (1979) (Blackman, J., concurring); see 626 F.2d at 1256-57.
128. 626 F.2d at 1257. The Brewer court seemed particularly influenced in its rejection
of Justice Blackmun's analysis by the fact that the defamatory remarks'by the defendant were
not an historical recollection of a past event, but rather the contemporaneous reporting of a
news event (e.g., the apparent renewal of the Presley/Brewer relationship). In this regard, the
court was able to distinguish Wolston, and thus specifically rejected the approach taken in that
case by Justices Blackmun and Marshall. Id. at 1256-57.
129. Id. Brewer's relationship with Presley continued for several years. Although it was
of some public concern, it could not be associated with a specific controversial event, such as
the espionage or rape trials that were background controversies in Wolston and Street v.
N.B.C., 645 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1981), appeal dismissedper stipulation, 50 U.S.L.W. (U.S.
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court would have adopted Blackmun's analysis had Brewer's publicfigure status resulted from a specific incident is, of course, speculative. Whether Brewer is authority for denying a return to privatefigure status for plaintiffs who have once achieved public-figure classification from a specific event is likewise debatable. 130
Further indication that the Fifth Circuit might have departed
from the virtual unanimity of precedent in the other circuits is evidenced by the court's holding that for limited-purpose public figures,
the passage of time narrows the range of issues for which actual
malice protection will be afforded to the press. 131 This new position
appears to take Justice Blackmun's
view into account, although it
13 2
does not find it controlling.
Wolston in the Court of Appeals
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia addressed the issue two years before the Brewer decision in Wolston v.
Reader's Digest Ass'n."3' Of all the circuit court decisions discussed,
this was the only one in which the Supreme
Court granted certiorari
134
and in which it was faced with the issue.
Wolston concerned a widely publicized trial in which the plaintiff's uncle was prosecuted for espionage. The plaintiff was held in
contempt when he failed to respond to a subpeona to appear as a
witness.1 3 5 The defendant published a book about the trial, which the
plaintiff claimed defamed him.136 Interestingly, the court, applying
the Gertz criteria, 37 found that Wolston had voluntarily subjected
himself to public attention by failing to respond to the subpeona during the original trial. Since Russian espionage was still a matter of
Dec. 15, 1981) (No. 80-6835).
130.

The Brewer court conceded that this particular case was not of the type envisioned

by Justices Blackmun and Marshall in Wolston, in that Mrs. Brewer's fame could not be tied
to any particular event or controversy. Id. at 1256-57.
131.

Id. at 1257. It is unclear whether this implies that a lengthier passage of time will

narrow the range of issues even further--conceivably even to the point where time obliterates
the need for any proof of actual malice.

132. Had the publication been a defamatory recollection of Brewer's prior relationship
with Presley, rather than a false contemporaneous account of their supposed reunion, the court

would arguably have given more weight to the proposed analysis.
133.
134.

578 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd, 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
439 U.S. 1066 (1979), granting cert. to 578 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Several of

the other cases discussed, notably Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979), have also
been heard by the Supreme Court, but did not touch on this issue.
135. 429 F. Supp. 167, 169 (D.D.C. 1977).
136. Id. at 168.

137. Id. at 172-73.
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public concern, the court held that the plaintiff remained a public
figure, notwithstanding the passage of sixteen years.13 8 The court of
appeals then affirmed the district court, 139 which had granted summary judgment for the defendant. The court reasoned that "'historical comment on ... espionage-related activities ... requires just as
much protection as did media coverage of the events as they occured.' ,140 This specific line of reasoning was not reached by the
majority in the Supreme Court, although Justice Blackmun, joined
by Justice Marshall in concurrence, considered it an important fac1 41
tor requiring reversal.
Street in the Court of Appeals
More recently, the Fourth Circuit considered this issue in Street
v. N.B.C.1 42 Even more than in Sidis,1 43 the facts in Street represent
the most appealing case for allowing a former public figure to resume private-citizen status. The plaintiff in Street had been the central figure in a rape trial forty years before. 14 4 At that time, she
achieved public-figure status, 145 as the trial received extensive media
attention and had racial overtones. Since the trial, however, the
plaintiff had avoided public attention and succeeded in returning to a
relatively private life. The defendant television network then broadcast a movie based on the trial, depicting the plaintiff in a very unfavorable light.1 46 The critical element in this defamation suit was
whether the plaintiff was still a public figure, notwithstanding the
forty-year period between the trial and the defamation.147 On the
authority of Brewer14 and Meeropol,1 49 the court declared that once
138. Id. at 176, 178.
139. Id. at 435, affig 429 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1977).
140. Id. at 431 (quoting 429 F. Supp. 167, 178 (D.D.C. 1977)).
141. 443 U.S. 157, 170-71 (1979)(Blackmun, J., concurring). For a discussion of the
implications of this concurring opinion by Justices Blackmun and Marshall, see supra note 74
and accompanying text.
142. 645 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1981), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 50 U.S.L.W.
3477 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1981)(No. 80-6835).
143. Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940).
144. 645 F.2d at 1229-30.
145. Id. at 1234-35. The case generated several appeals and increasing public attention.
Mrs. Street, a white woman, accused several black men of raping her. The case became known
as "The Scottsboro Boys Trial."
146. Id. at 1230-32. Among other things, the movie depicted the plaintiff as being unchaste; it also erroneously stated that she was dead.
147. Id. at 1233-36.
148. Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1980), cited with approval in 645 F.2d at 1235.
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a person is classified as a public figure, the classification continues
for as long as the controversy lasts, so as to allow later commentary
on the event that made him or her a public figure.150 The court contended that "the press [needs] sufficient breathing room to compose
the first rough draft of history [and] the historian [needs the same
'151
protection] when he writes the second or the third draft."
This rationale contradicts the analysis proposed by Justices
Blackmun and Marshall.Y52 The Street court must be questioned for
relying so heavily on Brewer when the facts of Street are much
closer to Wolston. 53 The Brewer court implied that had the plaintiff
in that case been tied to a particular controversy, succeeded more
completely in returning to private life, and been defamed by an historical work rather than by a report of an allegedly contemporary
event, it might have been inclined to adopt Justice Blackmun's rationale in Wolston.Y54 In Street, the plaintiff undoubtedly attained public-figure status via involvement in a particular controversy. She also
undeniably returned to private life, and suffered injury to her reputation by an historical dramatization. Street is therefore distinguishable from Brewer. While the Street court also relied heavily on Meer55
opol, this authority is similarly questionable.
149. Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1066 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 1013
(1977), cited with approval in 646 F.2d at 1235. The Street court also cited the decisions of
Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940), and
Time, Inc., v. Johnston, 448 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1971) as authority. 645 F.2d at 1235.
150. 645 F.2d at 1236. To support its decision, the court contended that prior public
figures do not lose access to channels of communications to rebut false statements. Id. This
argument, however, directly contradicts Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Wolston v.
Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 170 (1979) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring), which posits that
prior public figures do indeed lose access to the media. According to Justice Blackmun, as
public interest in a person or event dies down, it becomes less credible to suggest that a person
maintains the media access he or she may once have had. Id. at 171 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
151. 645 F.2d at 1236.
152. Wolston, 443 U.S. at 171 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see supra note 74 and accompanying text.
153. The plaintiff in Street, much as the plaintiff in Wolston, assumed public-figure
status due to involvement in a controversial trial which aroused great public interest. Brewer,
on the other hand, became a public figure due to an ongoing relationship with a famous pop
singer. While the Brewer court could have distinguished Wolston, Street cannot be so distinguished, in that the plaintiff's public-figure classification is indeed tied to a particular controversy, as was the case in Wolston.
154. See Brewer, 626 F.2d at 1257.
155. Meeropol stands at best only indirectly for the proposition that a former public
figure must retain that status over time. See supra text accompanying notes 100-111. The
Street court itself noted that Meeropol only accepts that position sub silentio. Street, 645 F.2d
at 1235.
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Street is also subject to attack because it resurrects, in a slightly
different form, the newsworthiness test of the Rosenbloom.5 plurality. The Street court held that "once a person becomes a public
figure in connection with a particular controversy, that person remains a public figure thereafter for purposes of later commentary or
treatment of that controversy.' 57 As the dissent in Street pointed
out, "Mrs. Street is a public figure today because the majority thinks
the Scottsboro affair merits public attention."15 8 This is nothing less
than the newsworthiness standard that was specifically overruled by
Gertz.'5 9

Had the case been heard by the Supreme Court, Mrs. Street
would not have been able to argue that she was never a public
figure. 60 Rather, she would have been forced to rely on her lastditch argument-that the lapse of time had erased .her public-figure
classification.1 ' Yet the settlement of the case has postponed the

resolution of a confused area of law.16 2 Accordingly, the need for
Supreme Court guidance on this issue remains.
N.B.C. AND THE SUPREME COURT'S TREATMENT OF
LOSING PUBLIC-FIGURE STATUS OVER TIME

STREET V.

In the past, the Supreme Court has developed a narrow view of
public-figure status. 163 The Court has restricted the class of public
figures by supplementing the Gertz criteria with additional elements

to be met by a plaintiff, such as being in a position to influence public opinion.16 4 Yet the Supreme Court decisions do not articulate spe156. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
157. 645 F.2d at 1235 (emphasis in original).
158. Id. at 1247 (Peck, J., dissenting). Judge Peck saw no merit in the majority's analysis of the case. "The better approach is to take the distinction between public and private
figures back to its roots, and examine the present status of the plaintiff in light of the reasons
behind the distinction .

. . ."

Id. at 1248 (Peck, J., dissenting).

159. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974); accord Street, 645 F.2d at
1247 (Peck, J., dissenting).
160. There is little doubt that under the Gertz criteria, Street's role in such a highly
publicized trial propelled her into the public-figure classification. Both the district court, 512
F. Supp. 398, 409 (E.D. Tenn. 1977), and the court of appeals so held. 645 F.2d at 1235.
161. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
162. The exact terms of the settlement were not disclosed. A Legacy from the Scottsboro Case, Bergen Rec., Jan. 4, 1982, at A-I.
163. Public-figure defamation law has always been a troublesome area for the Supreme
Court, as its goal to strike a perfect balance between freedom of the press and the right to a
good reputation has proved elusive on several occasions. This has, in turn, made it difficult for
the courts of appeals to apply the Supreme Court's precedent consistently.
164. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453 (1976).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol10/iss3/6

20

Kaminsky: Defamation Law: Once a Public Figure Always a Public Figure?
1982]

DEFAMATION LAW

cific guidelines for the lower courts to follow. The lower courts therefore adhere to the simpler Gertz'6 5 opinion, which allows for wide
discretion in determining who should and should not be a public
figure. Gertz limits the class only insofar as a person either

"achieve[s] . . . pervasive fame or notoriety" or voluntarily seeks

public attention. 166 The Court reasoned that these individuals have
reasonable media access, and are less vulnerable to injury. These criby
teria leave gray areas, which the circuit courts have resolved
1 67
keeping the public-figure classification as broad as possible. ,
Similarly, in dealing with the question of whether the passage of
time should ever erase a person's public-figure status, the appellate
courts have adopted a broad view of the issue, holding for the most
part that a person who attains public-figure status during his or her
lifetime remains a public figure forever. The Supreme Court has not
yet addressed the issue.168 Allowing a person to cease being a public
figure would serve to narrow further the class of public-figure plaintiffs, a position consistent with the development of defamation law
by the Supreme Court. 69
Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n170 was a case in which sixteen
years had elapsed between the event purporting to create publicfigure status in the plaintiff and the publication of allegedly defamatory remarks by the defendant. In the lower courts, the plaintiff had
fought the defendant's contention that he should be considered a
public figure on two grounds. First, he claimed that he never had
been a public figure, and second, that even if he had once been a
public figure, the passage of time had restored him to private-individual status for purposes of defamation law. 171 The lower courts rejected both contentions, declaring that the 2plaintiff had been, and
7
still was to be considered, a public figure.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals de165.

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).

166.

Id. at 351.

167.

See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.

168.

"Because petitioner does not press the issue [of ceasing to be a public figure] we

need not and do not decide whether or when an individual who was once a public figure may
lose that status by the passage of time." Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 166

n.7 (1979).
169.
Firestone,
170.
171.
172.

Compare New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) with Time, Inc. v.
424 U.S. 448 (1976) and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
443 U.S. 157 (1979).
578 F.2d 427, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1978); 429 F. Supp. 167, 174 (D.D.C. 1978).
578 F.2d at 431; 429 F. Supp. at 176, 178.
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cision on the first ground, 17 3 so that the lower courts' second holding
was never discussed. As a result, the question of whether the passage
of time could restore a person to private-individual status was left
unresolved.
The Wolston majority provided no indication of how it might
have addressed the issue had the need to do so persisted. Yet in their
concurring opinion, Justices Blackmun and Marshall qualify the majority view of a public figure. They expressly state that even if the
plaintiff were originally a public figure, the lapse of sixteen years
would have erased any possibility that the plaintiff was a public
figure at the time of the alleged defamation.17 4 This is a clear indication that at least two Supreme Court Justices favor a holding that
the passage of time erases public-figure status under those
circumstances.
Street v. N.B.C.
Street v. N.B.C. 11 was the perfect opportunity for the Supreme
Court to answer the question it left unresolved in Wolston. As in
that case, the plaintiff in Street allegedly obtained public-figure status due to prior involvement in criminal proceedings.17 6 Unlike Wolston, whose role was too minimal to warrant public-figure classification, there can be little argument that Mrs. Street was indeed a
public figure at the time of the trial proceedings. 7 This determination, coupled with the fact that for forty years the plaintiff returned
to private life, presented the issue in pristine form.
The grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court to the petitioner
in Street 7 1 suggested that at least four of the Justices were not persuaded by the respondent's argument that the apparent unanimity of
the courts of appeals had already resolved the issue.
Rather,
unique factors in each of those cases suggest that the issue was ripe
for Supreme Court resolution in favor of the plaintiff.
173. 443 U.S. at 169.
174. "Assuming, arguendo, that petitioner gained public-figure status [during his involvement in] the espionage controversy in 1958, he clearly had lost that distinction by the
time respondents published KGB in 1974." Id. at 170 (Blackmun, J., concurring)(emphasis
omitted).
175. 645 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1981), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 50 U.S.L.W.
3477 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1981)(No. 80-6835).
176. Id. at 1234-35.
177. See supra note 174.
178. 50 U.S.L.W. 3245 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1981)(No. 80-6835).
179. Brief of Respondent in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 24.
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The Supreme Court would not have been troubled by the reasoning in other appellate court cases when deciding Street. The Second Circuit decisions in Sidisi80 (a privacy cause of action) and
Meeropoll" (lack of identification of plaintiffs) are distinguishable
because Street is clearly a defamation action involving a publication
undeniably referring to the plaintiff. The Fourth Circuit case of
Time, Inc. v. Johnston182 was not even remotely comparable to
Street because of the petitioner's complete retreat from the events
that made her a public figure. Likewise, the District of Columbia
and Fifth Circuit decisions of Wolston18' and Brewer1 ' are also not
persuasive authority because of the forty-year separation between
status and the defendant's defamathe plaintiff's prior public-figure
18 5
tory publication in Street.
A finding that Street did indeed shed her public-figure status
would have narrowed the class of people who could qualify as a public figure, thus continuing the trend begun by the Supreme Court in
Gertz.186 Such a holding would necessarily have accepted the argument that historical analysis does not need as much first amendment
protection as does contemporary reporting of an event. It would also
have afforded limited public figures the opportunity to escape eventually the threat of defamatory publications.
From the perspective that it left a highly controversial area of
law unresolved, the Street settlement is most unfortunate. All indications-particularly N.B.C.'s agreement to settle a case it had won at
both the district and court of appeals levels,18 7 as well as the Supreme Court's treatment of public-figure law-suggest that the
Court was ready to reverse the lower courts and declare that Mrs.
Street at one time had, but no longer retained, public-figure status.
N.B.C.'s settlement with Mrs. Street preserves the malice requirement for past public figures, allowing future defendants unwarranted
protection in defamation actions.
180.
181.

Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940).
Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013

(1978).
182.
183.
184.
101 S. Ct.
185.

448 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1971).
578 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
3112 (1981).
Brewer involved an eight year lapse of time, see 626 F.2d at 1240, and Wolston

involved 16 years. 578 F.2d at 431.
186.
187.

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
N.B.C. had won at the district court level because Mrs. Street was unable to estab-

lish the negligence of the defendant. 512 F. Supp. 398, 411 (E.D. Tenn. 1977).
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STANDARD

In keeping with the theory that loss of public-figure status is
indeed a last-ditch effort by public figures to avoid the actual malice
requirement,""' a finding that prior public-figure status has been
erased should be reserved only for truly exceptional circumstances.
Accordingly, any test designed to resolve the issue must ferret out
situations where the Supreme Court has previously indicated that it
would be inappropriate to remove the press' actual malice protection.
This proposed test presents four tiers of criteria-drawn from several
of the cases already discussed-that a plaintiff must successfully
overcome to shed public-figure status.
Initially, there is a class of public figures who rightfully deserve
to be treated as public figures for all time. This class would consist
of all-purpose public figures as developed by Gertz189 and its progeny.190 A finding that a particular plaintiff qualifies as an all-purpose
public figure would remove any possibility that he or she could ever
return to private-citizen status.
More often, however, plaintiffs fall into the limited public-figure
category. 19 ' These plaintiffs would still need to satisfy three additional elements before shedding their public-figure classification.
There must be a determination of whether a plaintiff played a major
role in a controversy of significant public interest in which he or she
tried to influence public opinion. In Time, Inc. v. Firestone,92 the
decision from which this particular criterion is drawn, the Supreme
Court stated that it is a mistake to "equate 'public controversy' with
all controversies of interest to the public."""3 Accordingly, mere involvement in a public controversy would not automatically deny a
plaintiff the chance to extinguish public-figure status. Rather, he or
she would have to have played a major role in attempting to influence the resolution of a particular controversy before being declared
a public figure for all time based on that criterion.
The third determination is whether or not the plaintiff made a
deliberate and successful attempt to return to a life of obscurity fol188. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
189. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
190. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire,

443 U.S. 111 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130 (1967).
191. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351.
192. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
193. Id. at 454.
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lowing the event that originally brought him or her into the spotlight. Such an attempt would occur where a plaintiff completely disassociated himself or herself from the event which made him or her
a public figure, and subsequently refrained from focusing public attention on his or her prior public-figure status until the defendant's
defamatory publication.
The final obstacle involves the length of time between the plaintiff's prior public-figure status and the defamatory publication. Although it would be impossible to establish an exact figure in terms of
years, naturally, the longer the period, the stronger the plaintiff's argument. Fifteen to twenty years, however, seems like a reasonable
lapse of time, allowing for discretion depending on the nature of the
19 4
case.
The length-of-time criterion is somewhat analogous to the general statute of limitations concept that is applied in virtually all civil
and criminal actions.1 95 Much as it becomes beneficial, in time, to
negate the threat of litigation, it would be similarly beneficial to allow appropriate plaintiffs an eventual return to private-citizen status.
After fifteen or twenty years, in the absence of exceptional circumstances,19 6 the value of repose should become paramount. If a plaintiff has met all four of the above qualifications, it would be appropriate to declare that person no longer to be a public figure.
Application of this test to the courts of appeals decisions previously discussed yields interesting results: All of the plaintiffs - Sidis, Meeropol, Johnston, Brewer, Wolston, and Street-would successfully clear the first requirement of being a limited-purpose public
figure. None of them achieved such a state of fame as would warrant
all-purpose classification.
The second obstacle would also be cleared by all of the plaintiffs. Even though Brewer and Street were central to their particular
controversies, they did not attempt to influence public opinion beyond their immediate situations. Johnston, Wolston, Meeropol, and
Sidis, although involved in matters of public concern, either were not
central to the issues involved, or simply were not involved in contro194.

Indeed, sixteen years was determined to be an adequate amount of time by Justices

Blackmun and Marshall in Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 170 (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
195. See generally 51 Am. JUR 2d, Limitations of Actions § 17 (1970).

196. If exceptional circumstances result in the plaintiff once again becoming newsworthy, then it would be appropriate to hold the plaintiff to public-figure status. The concept

of losing public-figure status should be applicable only to historical analysis of past events, and
not to contemporaneous reporting of current news events.
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versial public issues. Johnston would be trapped by the third requirement. His pursuance of a coaching career in the years since his retirement as a player 19 7 negates any claim he might otherwise have
had of an attempted return to private life. The Meeropols would be
entangled in this requirement as well. By revealing their identities,' 98
the Meeropol children voluntarily revealed that they were the Rosenberg children. If the defendants had revealed their identity, they
would then have met this third requirement. Conversely, the four
other plaintiffs under discussion would qualify as having successfully
disassociated themselves from the events that made them public
figures.
The length-of-time criterion would certainly entrap Brewer. The
eight year lapse in Brewer"" would be inadequate to rid the plaintiff
of her public-figure status, particularly in light of the continuing
public focus upon Elvis Presley. Although Sidis200 presents a hard
case if the time requirement is viewed in isolation, in Sidis' particular circumstances, including a complete absence of a pressing public
controversy, the sixteen-year period should be sufficient to push him
across this final barrier to shedding public-figure status. The same
sixteen-year lapse occurred in Wolston.2 0 1 There, Justices Blackmun
and Marshall in concurrence were ready to accept this period as a
reasonable length of time for allowing Wolston private-plaintiff
status.20 2

Under the proposed test, only three of the six plaintiffs considered would succeed in completely extinguishing their public-figure
status-Sidis, Wolston, and Street. 03 Of course, a return to privatecitizen status is not a guarantee that a plaintiff will prevail in a defamation suit, as he or she would still have to establish that a publication was indeed defamatory, as the Sidis and Meeropol cases204
197.
198.

Time, Inc. v. Johnston, 448 F.2d 378, 381 (4th Cir. 1971).
Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1067-68 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 443 U.S.

1013 (1978).
199.
200.
201.
202.

Brewer v. Memphis Pub. Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1240 (5th Cir. 1980).
Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940).
Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
Id. at 169 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see supra note 74.

203. Sidis, Wolston, and Street meet all the requirements of the proposed test for relinquishing public-figure status, and made determined efforts to disassociate themselves from the
events that made them public figures. As required by the third tier, none of these plaintiffs
played a central role in attempting to influence the resolution of a public controversy. Also,

there were lengthy intervals between the fame of these public figures and the subsequent defamatory publications.
204. Sidis, even though he would have successfully shed his public-figure classification,
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demonstrate. Also necessary is the requisite showing of fault under
the applicable state law.
Should the Supreme Court eventually conclude that the passage
of time does not erase public-figure status, then all plaintiffs who
have appeared in the public eye, for however short a period and for
whatever reason, will be required to establish actual malice of any
media defendant who may make a defamatory publication on issues
that relate to his or her public-figure status. Alternatively, should the
Supreme Court conclude that a public figure, under appropriate circumstances, can indeed shed public-figure status, a new strategy for
circumventing the actual malice requirement in defamation suits will
become available to former public figures.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has consistently narrowed the class of
plaintiffs who must establish a defendant's actual malice in making a
defamatory publication. It first limited the class to public figures as
defined by Gertz, and subsequently refined the Gertz criteria. This
trend indicates that save for an out-of-court settlement, the Court
would once again have narrowed the class of public figures by eliminating those individuals who have returned to private lives following
an earlier limited stay in the limelight.
Although subsequently dismissed by the Supreme Court, Street
remains important for two reasons. First, the granting of certiorari
suggests that at least four Justices were not receptive to the argument that the unanimity of result in the courts of appeals had properly resolved the issue. Second, N.B.C.'s settlement of a case it had
won in the lower courts suggests that N.B.C. strongly envisioned a
reversal by the Supreme Court.
Since Street was never argued before the Supreme Court, extinguishing public-figure status remains only a possibility. Yet the grant
of certiorari in the case may give hope to future defamation plaintiffs. Certainly those in Mrs. Street's position, who lack media access
to rebut unfavorable commentary, should not be deemed to "assume
the risk that the most personal aspects of their lives will be presented
to the nation as dramatic entertainments. ' 20 5 The analytical strucwould have lost his libel suit because the defendant's publication was not defamatory. 113 F.2d
at 807. The same holds true for the Meeropols. 560 F.2d at 1065.
205. Street, 645 F.2d at 1248 (Peck, J., dissenting).
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ture that this note proposes is responsive to the concerns of both the
injured plaintiff and the media defendant.
Alan Kaminsky
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